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ABSTRACT
We introduce FnF-BFT, a parallel-leader byzantine fault-tolerant
state-machine replication protocol for the partially synchronous
model with theoretical performance bounds during synchrony. By
allowing all replicas to act as leaders and propose requests inde-
pendently, FnF-BFT parallelizes the execution of requests. Leader
parallelization distributes the load over the entire network – in-
creasing throughput by overcoming the single-leader bottleneck.
We further use historical data to ensure that well-performing repli-
cas are in command. FnF-BFT’s communication complexity is linear
in the number of replicas during synchrony and thus competitive
with state-of-the-art protocols. Finally, with FnF-BFT, we introduce
a BFT protocol with performance guarantees in stable network
conditions under truly byzantine attacks.
KEYWORDS
State machine replication, consensus, byzantine fault tolerant, par-
allel leaders, performance optimization
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
In state machine replication (SMR) protocols, distributed replicas aim
to agree on a sequence of client requests in the presence of faults.
To that end, SMR protocols rely strongly on another primitive of
distributed computing, consensus.
For protocols to maintain security under attack from malicious
actors, consensus must be reached even when the replicas are al-
lowed to send arbitrary information, namely under byzantine fail-
ures. The protocols that offer these guarantees, i.e., are resilient
against byzantine failures while continuing system operation, are
known as byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols.
The first practical BFT system, PBFT [8], was introduced more
than two decades ago and has since sparked the emergence of
numerous BFT systems [14, 17, 27]. However, even today, BFT
protocols do not scale well with the number of replicas, making
large-scale deployment of BFT systems a challenge. Often, the ori-
gin of this issue stems from the single-leader bottleneck: most BFT
protocols rest the responsibility of executing client requests on a
single leader instead of distributing it amongst replicas [25]. In such
systems, the sole leader’s hardware easily becomes overburdened
with its duty as the central communication point of the message
flow.
Recently, protocols tackling the single-leader bottleneck through
parallelization emerged and demonstrated staggering performance
increases over state-of-the-art sequential-leader protocols [15, 20,
25]. In the same fashion as most of their single leader counterparts,
these works only consider non-malicious faults for the performance
analysis. However, malicious attacks may lead to significant per-
formance losses that are not evaluated. While these systems ex-
hibit promising system performance with simple faults, they fail
to lower-bound their performance in the face of malicious attacks
from byzantine replicas.
In this work, we propose Fast’n’Fair-BFT (FnF-BFT), a parallel-
leader BFT protocol. FnF-BFT circumvents the common single-
leader bottleneck by utilizing parallel leaders to distribute the
weight amongst all system replicas – achieving a significant per-
formance increase over sequential-leader systems. FnF-BFT scales
well with the number of replicas and preserves high throughput
even under arbitrarily malicious attacks from the byzantine replicas.
To establish this ability of our protocol, we define a new perfor-
mance property, namely byzantine-resilient performance, which en-
capsulates the ratio between the best-case and worst-case through-
put of a BFT protocol, i.e., the effective utilization. Specifically, we
bound this ratio to be constant, meaning that the throughput of
a protocol under byzantine faults is lower-bounded by a constant
fraction of the best-case throughput where no faults are present. We
show that FnF-BFT achieves byzantine-resilient performance with
a ratio of 16/27 while maintaining safety and liveness. The analysis
of FnF-BFT is done under the partially synchronous communica-
tion model, meaning that a known bound ∆ on message delivery
holds after some unknown global stabilization time (GST). We fur-
ther evaluate our protocol’s efficiency by analyzing the amortized
authenticator complexity after GST, similarly to HotStuff [27].
1.2 Related Work
Lamport et al. [18] first discussed the problem of reaching consen-
sus in the presence of byzantine failures. Following its introduction,
byzantine fault tolerance was initially studied in the synchronous
network setting [10, 11, 22]. Concurrently, the impossibility of deter-
ministically reaching consensus in the asynchronous setting with
a single replica failure was shown by Fischer et al. [13]. Dwork et
al. [12] proposed the concept of partial synchrony and demonstrated
the feasibility of reaching consensus in partially synchronous net-
works. While the presented protocol always ensured safety, liveness
relied on synchronous network conditions. During synchrony, the
communication complexity of DSL is O(n4) – making it unsuitable
for deployment. In contrast to these works, FnF-BFT guarantees
safety and liveness in partial synchrony, while the communication
complexity is only O(n).
Reaching consensus is needed to execute requests for state ma-
chine replication. Reiter [23, 24] introduces Rampart, an early proto-
col tackling byzantine fault tolerance for state machine replication.
Rampart excludes faulty replicas from the group and replaces them
with new replicas to make progress. Thus, Rampart relies on failure
detection, which cannot be accurate in an asynchronous system, as
shown by Lynch [19]. On the other hand, FnF-BFT does not rely
on failure detection.
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With PBFT, Castro and Liskov [8] devised the first efficient pro-
tocol for state machine replication that tolerates byzantine failures.
The leader-based protocol requires O(n2) communication to reach
consensus, as well as O(n3) for leader replacement. While widely
deployed, PBFT does not scale well when the number of replicas
increases. The quadratic complexity faced by the leader represents
PBFT’s bottleneck [7]. In this work, we tackle this issue by introduc-
ing parallel leaders that share the weight, thus efficiently alleviating
the single leader’s bottleneck.
Kotla et al. [17] were the first to achieve O(n) complexity with
Zyzzyva, an optimistic linear path PBFT. The complexity of leader
replacement in Zyzzyva remains O(n3), and safety violations were
later exposed [1]. SBFT, devised by Gueta et al. [14], is a recent
leader-based protocol that achieves O(n) complexity and improves
the complexity of exchanging leaders to O(n2). While reducing
the overall complexity, the single leader is the bottleneck for both
Zyzzyva and SBFT.
Developed by Yin et al. [27], leader-based HotStuff matches
the O(n) complexity of Zyzzyva and SBFT. HotStuff rotates the
leader with every request and is the first to achieve O(n) for leader
replacement. However, HotStuff offers little parallelization, and
experiments have revealed high complexity in practice [25]. While
HotStuff’s pipeline design offers an improvement over PBFT, its
primary downside lies in the sequential proposal of requests and
results in a lack of parallelism. On the contrary, n parallel leaders
propose requests simultaneously in FnF-BFT.
Mao et al. [20, 21] were the first to point out the importance of
multiple leaders for high-performance state machine replication
withMencius and BFT-Mencius.Menciusmaps client requests to the
closest leader, and in turn, requests can become censored. However,
no de-duplication measures are in place to handle the re-submission
of censored client requests. FnF-BFT addresses this problem by
periodically rotating leaders over the client space.
Gupta et al. [15] recently introduced MultiBFT. MultiBFT is a
protocol-agnostic approach to parallelize and improve existing BFT
protocols. While allowing multiple instances to each run an individ-
ual client request, the protocol requires instances to unify after each
request – creating a significant overhead. Additionally, MultiBFT
relies on failure detection, which is only possible in synchronous
networks [19]. With FnF-BFT, we allow leaders to make progress
independently of each other without relying on failure detection.
Similarly, Stathakopoulou et al. [25] further investigatedmultiple
leader protocols with Mir. Mir significantly improves throughput in
comparison to sequential-leader approaches. However, as Mir runs
instances of PBFT on a set of leaders, it incurs O(n2) complexity,
as well as O(n3) complexity to update the leader set. Additionally,
while exhibiting a high-throughput in the presence of crash failures,
we expect Mir’s performance to drop significantly in the presence
of fully byzantine replicas. Mir updates the leader set as soon as a
single leader in the set stops making progress – allowing byzantine
leaders to repeatedly end epochs early. FnF-BFT, however, contin-
ues to make progress in the presence of unresponsive byzantine
leaders. We further show that the byzantine-resilient throughput is
a constant fraction of the best-case throughput.
Byzantine resilience was first studied in detail with the intro-
duction of Aardvark by Clement et al. [9]. Aardvark is an adapta-
tion of PBFT with frequent view-changes: a leader only stays in
its position when displaying an increasing throughput level. This
first approach, however, comes with significant performance cuts
in networks without failures. Parallel leaders allow FnF-BFT to
be byzantine-resilient without accepting significant performance
losses in an ideal setting.
Byzantine resilience has further been studied since the intro-
duction of Aardvark. Prime, proposed by Amir et al. [2, 3], aims to
maximize performance in malicious environments. Besides, adding
delay constraints that further confine the partially synchronous
network model, Prime restricts its evaluation to delay attacks, i.e.,
the leader adds as much delay as possible to the protocol. Simi-
larly, Veronese et al. [26] only evaluated their proposed protocol,
Spinning, in the presence of delay attacks – not fully capturing pos-
sible byzantine attacks. Consequently, the maximum performance
degradation Spinning and Prime can incur under byzantine faults
is at least 78% [5]. We analyze FnF-BFT theoretically to capture the
entire spectrum of possible byzantine attacks.
Aublin et al. [5] further explore the performance of BFT proto-
cols in the presence of byzantine attacks with RBFT. RBFT runs
f backup instances on the same set of client requests as the mas-
ter instance to discover whether the master instance is byzantine.
Thus, RBFT incurs quadratic communication complexity for every
request. In this work, we reduce the communication complexity to
O(n) and further increase performance through parallelization – al-
lowing byzantine-resilience without the added burden of detecting
byzantine leaders.
1.3 Our Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, we introduce the first multiple leader
BFT protocol with performance guarantees in stable network con-
ditions under truly byzantine attacks, which we term FnF-BFT.
Specifically, FnF-BFT is the first BFT protocol that achieves all the
following properties:
• Optimistic Performance:After GST, the best-case through-
put is Ω(n) times higher than for sequential-leader protocols.
• Byzantine-Resilient Performance: After GST, the worst-
case throughput of the system is at least a constant fraction
of its best-case throughput.
• Efficiency:After GST, the amortized authenticator complex-
ity of reaching consensus is Θ(n).
We achieve these properties by combining two key components.
First, we enable all replicas to continuously act as leaders in parallel
to share the load of clients’ requests. Second, unlike other protocols,
we do not replace leaders upon failure but configure each leader’s
load based on the leader’s past performance. Through this combi-
nation, we guarantee a fair distribution of the requests according
to each replica’s capacity, which in turn results in fast processing
of requests.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first define the
model as well as the protocol goals (Section 2). Then, we introduce
the design of FnF-BFT (Section 3); later, we present a security and
performance analysis of our protocol (Section 4). We conclude with
Section 5.
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2 THE MODEL
The system consists of n = 3f + 1 authenticated replicas and a set
of clients. We index replicas by u ∈ [n] = {1, 2, . . . ,n}.
At most f replicas in the system are byzantine; that is, instead
of following the protocol, they are controlled by an adversary with
full information on their internal state. All other replicas are as-
sumed to be correct, i.e., following the protocol. Byzantine replicas
may exhibit arbitrary adversarial behavior, meaning they can also
behave like correct replicas. An adversary may control a total of f
unique byzantine replicas throughout the protocol execution and
learn their internal state. The adversary cannot intercept the com-
munication between two correct replicas. Any number of clients
may be byzantine.
2.1 Communication Model
We show that FnF-BFT is safe in the asynchronous communica-
tion model, that is when messages between correct replicas are
assumed to arrive in arbitrary order after any finite delay. For all
other properties of the system, we consider a partially synchronous
communication model. More precisely, we assume a known bound ∆
onmessage transmission will hold between any two correct replicas
after some unknown global stabilization time (GST).
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
We make the usual cryptographic assumptions: the adversary is
computationally bounded, and cryptographically-secure communi-
cation channels, computationally secure hash functions, (threshold)
signatures, and encryption schemes exist.
Similar to other BFT algorithms [4, 14, 27], FnF-BFT makes use
of threshold signatures. In a (l ,n) threshold signature scheme, there
is a single public key held by all replicas and clients. Additionally,
each replica u holds a distinct private key allowing the generation
of a partial signature σu (m) for any messagem. Any set of l distinct
partial signatures for the same message, {σu (m) | u ∈ U , |U | = l},
can be combined (by any replica) into a unique signature σ (m).
The combined signature can be verified using the public key. We
assume that the scheme is robust, i.e., any verifier can easily filter
out invalid signatures from malicious participants. In this work, we
set l = 2f + 1.
2.3 Authenticator Complexity
Message complexity has long been considered the main throughput-
limiting factor in BFT protocols [14, 27]. In practice, however, the
throughput of a BFT protocol is limited by both its computational
footprint (mainly caused by cryptographic operations) and its mes-
sage complexity. Hence, to assess the performance and efficiency
of FnF-BFT, we adopt a complexity measure called authenticator
complexity [27].
An authenticator is any (partial) signature. We define the pro-
tocol’s authenticator complexity as the sum of all computations or
verifications by replicas of any authenticator during the protocol
execution.
Note that authenticator complexity also captures the message
complexity of a protocol if, like in FnF-BFT, each message can be as-
sumed to contain at least one signature. Unlike [27], where only the
number of received signatures is considered, our definition allows
us to capture the load handled by replicas more accurately. How-
ever, authenticator complexities, according to the two definitions,
only differ by a constant factor.
We only analyze the authenticator complexity after GST, as it is
impossible for a BFT protocol to ensure deterministic progress and
safety at the same time in an asynchronous network [13].
2.4 Protocol Overview
The FnF-BFT protocol implements a state machine (cf. Section 2.5)
that is replicated across all replicas in the system. Clients broadcast
requests to the system. Given client requests, replicas decide on the
order of request executions and deliver commit-certificates to the
clients.
Our protocol moves forward in epochs. In an epoch, each replicau
is responsible for ordering a set of up to Cu client requests that
are independent of all requests ordered by other replicas in the
epoch. Every replica in the system simultaneously acts as both a
leader and a backup to the other leaders. The number of assigned
client requests Cu is based on u’s past performance as a leader.
During the epoch-change, a designated replica acting as primary:
(a) ensures that all replicas have a consistent view of the past leader
and primary performance, (b) deduces non-overlapping sequence
numbers for each leader, and (c) assigns parts of the client space to
leaders.
An epoch-change occurs whenever requested by more than two-
thirds of the replicas. Whenever seeking an epoch-change, a replica
immediately stops participating in the previous epoch. The primary
in charge of the epoch-change is selected through periodic rotation
based on performance history. Replicas request an epoch-change if:
(a) all replicasu have exhausted theirCu requests, (b) a local timeout
is exceeded, or (c) enough other replicas request an epoch-change.
Hence, epochs have bounded-length.
2.5 Protocol Goals
FnF-BFT achieves scalable and byzantine fault-tolerant state ma-
chine replication (SMR). At the core of SMR, a group of replicas
decides on a growing log of client requests. Clients are provided
with cryptographically secure certificates for the commit of their
request. Fundamentally, the protocol will ensure:
(1) Safety: If any two correct replicas commit a request with the
same sequence number, they both commit the same request.
(2) Liveness: If a correct client broadcasts a request, then every
correct replica eventually commits the request.
Thus, FnF-BFT will eventually make progress, and valid client re-
quests cannot be censored. Additionally, FnF-BFT guarantees low
overhead in reaching consecutive consensus decisions. Unlike other
protocols limiting the worst-case efficiency for a single request, we
analyze the amortized authenticator complexity per request after
GST. We find this to be the relevant throughput-limiting factor.
FnF-BFT is efficient:
(3) Efficiency:After GST, the amortized authenticator complex-
ity of reaching consensus is Θ(n).
Furthermore, FnF-BFT achieves competitive performance under
both optimistic and pessimistic adversarial scenarios:
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(4) Optimistic Performance:After GST, the best-case through-
put is Ω(n) times higher than for sequential-leader protocols.
(5) Byzantine-Resilient Performance: After GST, the worst-
case throughput of the system is at least a constant fraction
of its best-case throughput.
Hence, FnF-BFT guarantees that byzantine replicas cannot arbitrar-
ily slow down the system when the network is stable.
3 FNF-BFT
FnF-BFT executes client requests on a state machine replicated
across a set of n replicas.
We advance FnF-BFT in a succession of epochs – identified by
monotonically increasing epoch numbers. Replicas in the system
act as leaders and backups concurrently. As a leader, a replica is
responsible for ordering client requests within its jurisdiction. Each
leader v is assigned a predetermined number of requestsCv to exe-
cute during an epoch. To deliver a client request,v starts by picking
the next available sequence number and shares the request with
the backups. Leader v must collect 2f + 1 signatures from replicas
in the leader prepare and commit phase (Algorithm 1) to commit
the request. We employ threshold signatures for the signature col-
lection – allowing us to achieve linear authenticator complexity
for reaching consensus on a request. Additionally, we use low and
high watermarks for each leader to represent a range of request
sequence numbers that each leader can propose concurrently to
boost individual leaders’ throughput.
Each epoch has a unique primary responsible for the preceding
epoch-change, i.e., moving the system into the epoch. The replica
elected as primary changes with every epoch and its selection is
based on the system’s history. A replica calls for an epoch-change
in any of the following cases: (a) the replica has locally committed
requests for all sequence number available in the epoch, (b) the
maximum epoch time expired, (c) the replica has not seen sufficient
progress, or (d) the replica has observed at least f +1 epoch-change
messages from other replicas.
FnF-BFT generalizes PBFT [8] to the n leader setting. Addition-
ally, we avoid PBFT’s expensive all-to-all communication during
epoch operation, similarly to Linear-PBFT [14].
Throughout this Section, we discuss the various components of
the protocol in further detail.
3.1 Client
Each client has a unique identifier. A client c requests the execution
of state machine operation r by sending a ⟨request, r , t , c⟩ to all
leaders. Here, timestamp t is a monotonically increasing sequence
number used to order the requests from one client. By using wa-
termarks, we allow clients to have more than one request in flight.
Client watermarks, low and high, represent the range of times-
tamp sequence numbers which the client can propose concurrently.
Thus, we require t to be within the low and high watermarks of
client c . The client watermarks are advanced similarly to the leader
watermarks (cf. Section 3.6).
Upon executing operation r , replicau responds to the client with
⟨reply, e,d,u⟩, where e is the epoch number and d is the request
digest (cf. Section 3.5)1. The client waits for f + 1 such responses
from the replicas.
3.2 Sequence Number Distribution
We distribute sequence numbers to leaders for the succeeding epoch
during the epoch-change. While we commit requests from each
leader in order, the requests from different leaders are committed
independently of each other in our protocol. Doing so allows lead-
ers to continue making progress in an epoch, even though other
leaders might have stopped working. Otherwise, a natural attack
for byzantine leaders is to stop working and force the system to
an epoch-change. Such attacks are possible in other parallel-leader
protocols such as Mir [25].
By allowing leaders to commit requests independent of each
other, we need to allocate sequence numbers to all leaders during
the epoch-change. Thus, we must also determine the number of
requests each leader is responsible for before the epoch. The number
of requests for leader v in epoch e is denoted by Cv (e). It can be
computed deterministically by all replicas in the network, based on
the known history of the system (cf. Section 3.7).
When assigning sequence numbers, we first automatically yield
to each leader v ∈ [n] the sequence numbers of the Ov (e) existing
hanging operations from previous epochs in the assigned bucket(s).
The remainingCv (e)−Ov (e) sequence numbers for each leader are
distributed to them one after each other according to their ordering
from the set of available sequence numbers. Note thatOv (e) cannot
exceed Cv (e).
For each leader v the assigned sequence numbers are mapped to
local sequence numbers 1v,e , 2v,e , . . . ,Cv (e)v,e in epoch e . These
sequence numbers are later used to simplify checkpoint creation
(cf. Section 3.6).
3.3 Hash Space Division
The request hash space is partitioned into buckets to avoid duplica-
tion. Each of these buckets is assigned to a single leader in every
epoch. We consider the client identifier to be the request input and
hash the client identifier (hc = h(c)) to map requests into buckets.
The hash space partition ensures that no two conflicting requests
will be assigned to different leaders2.
Thus, the requests served by different leaders are independent
of each other. Additionally, the bucket assignment is rotated round-
robin across epochs, preventing request censoring. The hash space
is portioned intom ·n non-intersecting buckets of equal size, where
m ∈ Z+ is a configuration parameter. Each leader v is then as-
signedmv (e) buckets in epoch e according to their load Cv (e) (cf.
Section 3.7). Leaders can only include requests from their active
buckets.
When assigning buckets to leaders, the protocol ensures that
every leader is assigned at least one bucket, as well as distributing
the buckets according to the load handled by the leaders. Precisely,
1Instead of committing client request independently, the protocol could easily be
adapted to process client requests in batches – a standard BFT protocol improve-
ment [17, 25, 27].
2Note that in case the requests are transactions with multiple inputs, the hash space
division is more challenging to circumvent double-spending attacks. In such cases, we
can employ well-known techniques [16, 28] with no performance overhead as long as
the average number of transactions’ inputs remains constant [6].
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the number of buckets leader v is assigned in epoch e is given by
mv (e) =
⌊
Cv (e)∑
u ∈[n]Cu (e)
(m − 1) · n
⌋
+ 1 + m˜v (e),
where m˜v (e) ∈ {0, 1} distributes the remaining buckets to the
leaders – ensuring
∑
u ∈[n]mu (e) = m · n. The remaining buckets
are allocated to leaders v with the biggest value:⌊
Cv (e)∑
u ∈[n]Cu (e)
(m − 1) · n
⌋
+ 1 − Cv (e)∑
u ∈[n]Cu (e)
·m · n.
Note that the system will require a sufficiently long stability
period for all correct leaders to be working at their capacity limit,
i.e., Cv (e) matching the performance of leader v in epoch e . Once
correct leaders function at their capacity, the number of buckets
they serve matches their capacity.
The hash buckets are distributed to the leaders through a de-
terministic rotation such that each leader repeatedly serves each
bucket under f + 1 unique primaries. This rotation prevents byzan-
tine replicas from censoring specific hash buckets.
Throughout the remaining thesis, we assume that there are al-
ways client requests pending in each bucket. Since we aim to op-
timize throughput, we consider this assumption in-sync with our
protocol goals.
3.4 Primary Rotation
While all replicas are tasked with being a leader at all times, only
a single replica acting as primary initiates an epoch. FnF-BFT as-
signs primaries periodically – exploiting the performance of good
primaries and being reactive to network changes.
The primary rotation consists of two core building blocks. For
one, FnF-BFT repeatedly rotates through the 2f + 1 best primaries
and thus exploits their performance. Moreover, the primary assign-
ment ensures that FnF-BFT explores every primary at least once
within a sliding window. The sliding window consists of д ∈ Z
epochs, and we set д ≥ 3f + 1 to allow the exploration of all pri-
maries throughout a sliding window. We depict a sample rotation
in Figure 1.
replica u’s
last turny replica ure-evaluatedy
sliding window
Figure 1: FnF-BFT primary rotation in a system with n = 10
replicas. In blue, we show epochs led by primaries elected
based on their performance. Epochs shown in yellow are led
by replicas re-evaluated once their last turn as primary falls
out of the sliding window.
Throughout the protocol, all replicas record the performance of
each primary. We measure performance as the number of requests
successfully committed under a primary in an epoch. Performance
can thus be determined during the succeeding epoch-change by
each replica (cf. Section 3.7). To deliver a reactive system, we update
a replica’s primary performance after each turn.
We rotate through the best 2f + 1 primaries repeatedly. After
every 2f + 1 primaries, the best 2f + 1 primaries are redetermined
and subsequently elected as primary in order of the time passed
since their last turn as primary. The primary that has not been seen
for the longest time is elected first.
Cycling through the best primaries maximizes system perfor-
mance. Simultaneously, basing performance solely on a replica’s
preceding primary performance strips byzantine primaries from
the ability to misuse a good reputation.
Every so often, we interrupt the continuous exploitation of the
best 2f + 1 primaries; to revisit replicas that fall out of the sliding
window. If replica u’s last turn as primary occurred in epoch e − д
by the time epoch e rolls around, replica u would be re-explored
as primary in epoch e . The exploration allows us to re-evaluate
all replicas as primaries periodically and ensures that FnF-BFT is
reactive to network changes.
Note that we start the protocol by exploring all primaries ordered
by their identifiers. We would also like to point out that only one
primary can fall out of the sliding window at any time after the
initial exploration. Thus, we always know which primary will be
re-evaluated.
3.5 Epoch Operation
To execute requests, we use a leader-based adaption of PBFT, similar
to Linear-PBFT [14]. Threshold signatures are commonly used to
reduce the complexity of the backup prepare and commit phases of
PBFT. The leader of a request is used as a collector of partial signa-
tures to create a (2f + 1,n) threshold signature in the intermediate
stages of the backup prepare and commit phases. We visualize the
schematic of the message flow for one request led by replica 0 in
Figure 2 and details of the three-phase protocol follow.
leader prepare backup prepare commit
0
1
2
3
Figure 2: Schematic message flow for one request.
Leader prepare phase. Upon receiving a ⟨request, r , t , c⟩ from a
client, each replica computes the hash of the client identifier c .
If the request falls into one of the active buckets belonging to
leader v , v verifies ⟨request, r , t , c⟩ from client c . The request is
discarded, if (a) it has already been prepared, or (b) it is already
pending. Once verified, leaderv broadcasts ⟨pre-prepare, sn, e,h(r ),
v⟩, where sn is the sequence number, e the current epoch, h(r ) is
the hash digest of request r and v represents the leader’s signature.
The cryptographic hash function h maps an arbitrary-length input
to a fixed-length output. We can use the digest h(r ) as a unique
identifier for a request r , as we assume the hash function to be
collision-resistant.
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Backup prepare phase. A backup w accepts ⟨pre-prepare, sn, e,
h(r ),v⟩ from leader v , if (a) the epoch number matches its local
epoch number, (b) w has not prepared another request with the
same sequence number sn in epoch e , (c) leader v leads sequence
number sn, (d) sn lies between the low and high watermarks of
leader v , (e) r is in the active bucket of v , and (f) r was submitted
by an authorized client. Upon accepting ⟨pre-prepare, sn, e,h(r ),
v⟩, w computes d = h(sn∥e ∥r ) where h is a cryptographic hash
function. Additionally,w signs d by computing a verifiable partial
signature σw (d). Then w sends ⟨prepare, sn, e,σw (d)⟩ to leader v .
Upon receiving 2f prepare messages for sn in epoch e , leader v of
sn forms a combined signature σ (d) from the 2f prepare messages
and its own signature. It then broadcasts ⟨prepared-certificate, sn,
e,σ (d)⟩ to all backups.
Commit phase. Backup w accepts the prepared-certificate and
replies ⟨commit, sn, e,σw (σ (d))⟩ to leader v . After collecting 2f
commit messages, leader v creates a combined signature σ (σ (d))
using the signatures from the collected commit messages and its
own signature. Once the combined signature is prepared, v con-
tinues by broadcasting ⟨commit-certificate, sn, e,σ (σ (d))⟩. Upon
receiving the commit-certificate, replicas execute r after delivering
all preceding requests led by v , and send replies to the client.
We summarize the protocol executed by replicas to deliver a
request proposed by leader v in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 is run
locally at all replicas in the system.
3.6 Checkpointing
Similar to PBFT [8], we periodically create checkpoints to prove
the correctness of the current state. Instead of requiring a costly
round of all-to-all communication to create a checkpoint, we add
an intermediate phase and let the respective leader collect partial
signatures to generate a certificate optimistically. Additionally, we
expand the PBFT checkpoint protocol to run for n parallel leaders.
For each leader v , we repeatedly create checkpoints to clear the
logs and advance the watermarks of leader v whenever the local se-
quence number snv,e,k is divisible by a constant k ∈ Z+. Recall that
when a replica u delivers a request for leader v with local sequence
number snv,e,k , this implies that all requests led by v with local
sequence number lower than snv,e,k have been locally committed
at replica u. Hence, after delivering the request with local sequence
number snv,e,k , replicau sends ⟨checkpoint, snv,e,k ,h(sn′v,e,k ),u⟩
to leaderv . Here, sn′v,e,k is the last checkpoint and h(sn′v,e,k ) is the
hash digest of the requests with sequence number snv in the range
sn′v,e,k ≤ snv ≤ snv,e,k . Leader v proceeds by collecting 2f + 1
checkpoint messages (including its own). Then leader v persists a
checkpoint-certificate by creating a combined threshold signature.
It sends the checkpoint-certificate to all other replicas. If a replica
sees the checkpoint-certificate, the checkpoint is stable and the
replica can discard the corresponding messages from its logs, i.e.,
for sequence numbers belonging to leader v lower than snv,e,k .
We use checkpointing to advance low and high watermarks. In
doing so, we allow several requests from a leader to be in flight. The
low watermark Lv for leader v is equal to the sequence number of
the last stable checkpoint, and the high watermark is Hv = Lv + 2k .
We set k to be large enough such that replicas do not stall. Given
Algorithm 1 Committing a request proposed by leader v
1: Leader prepare phase
2: as replica u:
3: upon receiving a valid ⟨request, r , t , c⟩ from client c:
4: map client request to hash bucket
5: as leader v :
6: accept ⟨request, r , t , c⟩ assigned to one ofv’s hash buckets
7: pick next assigned sequence number sn
8: broadcast ⟨pre-prepare, sn, e,h(r ),v⟩
9: Backup prepare phase
10: as backupw :
11: accept ⟨pre-prepare, sn, e,h(r ),v⟩
12: if the pre-prepare message is valid:
13: compute partial signature σw (d)
14: send ⟨prepare, sn, e,σw (d)⟩ to leader v
15: as leader v :
16: compute partial signature σv (d)
17: upon receiving 2f prepare messages:
18: compute (2f + 1,n) threshold signature σ (d)
19: broadcast ⟨prepared-certificate, sn, e,σ (d)⟩
20: Commit phase
21: as backupw :
22: accept ⟨prepared-certificate, sn, e,σ (d)⟩
23: compute partial signature σ (σw (d))
24: ⟨commit, sn, e,σw (σ (d))⟩ to leader v
25: as leader v :
26: compute partial signature σ (σv (d))
27: upon receiving 2f commit messages:
28: compute (2f + 1,n) threshold signature σ (σ (d))
29: broadcast ⟨commit-certificate, sn, e,σ (σ (d))⟩
its watermarks, leader v can only propose requests with a local
sequence number between low and high watermarks.
3.7 Epoch-Change
At a high level, we modify the PBFT epoch-change protocol as fol-
lows: we use threshold signatures to reduce the message complex-
ity and extend the epoch-change message to include information
about all leaders. Similarly to Mir [25], we introduce a round of
reliable broadcast to share information needed to determine the
configuration of the next epoch(s). In particular, we determine the
load assigned to each leader in the next epoch, based on their past
performance. We also record the performance of the preceding
primary. An overview of the epoch-change protocol can be found
in Algorithm 2, while a detailed description follows.
Calling epoch-change. We first describe when replicas call an
epoch-change. Replicas call an epoch-change by broadcasting an
epoch-change message in four cases:
(1) Replica u triggers an epoch-change in epoch e , once it has
committed everyone’s assigned requests locally.
(2) Additionally, replica u calls for an epoch-change when its
epoch timer expires. The value of the epoch timer T is set to
ensure that after GST, correct replicas can finish at leastCmin
requests during an epoch. Cmin ∈ Ω(n2) is the minimum
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Algorithm 2 Epoch-change protocol for epoch e + 1
1: Starting epoch-change
2: as replica u:
3: broadcast ⟨epoch-change, e + 1,S,C,P,Q,u⟩
4: upon receiving 2f other epoch-change messages for
epoch e + 1:
5: start epoch-change timer Te
6: Reliable broadcast
7: as primary pe+1:
8: compute Cv (e + 1) for all leaders v ∈ [n]
9: perform 3-phase reliable broadcast sharing configuration
details of epoch e + 1 and the performance of primary pe
10: as replica u:
11: participate in reliable broadcast initiates by pe+1
12: Starting epoch
13: as primary pe+1:
14: broadcast ⟨new-epoch, e + 1,V,O,pe+1⟩
15: enter epoch e + 1
16: as replica u:
17: accept ⟨new-epoch, e + 1,V,O,pe+1⟩
18: enter epoch e + 1
number of requests assigned to leaders. Each replica locally
starts the timer for epoch e upon entering the epoch.
(3) Replicas call epoch-changes upon observing inadequate progress.
Each replica u has individual no-progress timers for all lead-
ers. The no-progress timer is initialized with the same value
Tp for all. Initially, replicas set all no-progress timers for the
first time after 5∆ in the epoch – accounting for the message
transmission time of the initial requests. A replica resets the
timer for leader v every time it receives a commit-certificate
fromv . In case the replica has already committedCv requests
for leader v , the timer is no longer reset. Upon observing
no progress timeouts for b ∈ [f + 1, 2f + 1] different lead-
ers, a replica calls an epoch-change. Requiring at least f + 1
leaders to make progress ensures that a constant fraction
of leaders makes progress, and at least one correct leader
is involved. On the other hand, we demand no more than
2f + 1 leaders to make progress such that byzantine leaders
failing to execute requests cannot stop the epoch early. We
let b = 2f + 1 and set the no-progress timer such that it does
not expire for correct leaders and simultaneously ensures
sufficient progress, i.e., Tp ∈ Θ(T /Cmin).
(4) Finally, replica u also calls an epoch-change if it sees that
f +1 other replicas have called an epoch-change for an epoch
higher than e . It picks the smallest epoch in the set such that
byzantine replicas cannot advance the protocol an arbitrary
number of epochs.
After sending an epoch-change message, the replica will only start
its epoch-change timer, once it saw at least 2f + 1 epoch-change
messages. We will discuss the epoch-change timer in more detail
later.
Starting epoch-change (Algorithm 2, steps 1-5). To move the sys-
tem to epoch e + 1, replica u sends ⟨epoch-change, e + 1,S,C,P,
Q,u⟩ to all replicas in the system. Here, S is a vector of sequence
numbers snv of the last stable checkpoints Sv ∀v ∈ [n] known to u
for each leader v . C is a set of checkpoint-certificates proving the
correctness of Sv ∀v ∈ [n], while P contains sets Pv ∀v ∈ [n]. For
each leader v , Pv contains a prepared-certificate for each request r
that was prepared at u with sequence number higher than snv , if
replica v does not possess a commit-certificate for r . Similarly, Q
contains sets Qv ∀v ∈ [n]. Qv consists of a commit-certificate for
each request r that was prepared at u with sequence number higher
than snv .
Reliable broadcast (Algorithm 2, steps 6-11). The primary of epoch e+
1 (pe+1) waits for 2f epoch-change messages for epoch e . Upon
receiving a sufficient number of messages, the primary performs
a classical 3-phase reliable broadcast. During the broadcast, the
primary informs leaders of the number of requests assigned to each
leader in the next epoch and the identifiers of the replicas which
send epoch-change messages. The number of requests assigned
to a leader is computed deterministically (Algorithm 3). Through
the reliable broadcast, we ensure that the primary cannot share
conflicting information regarding the sequence number assignment
and, in turn, the next epoch’s sequence number distribution. In
addition to sharing information about the epoch configuration, the
primary also broadcasts the total number of requests committed
during the previous epoch. This information is used by the network
to evaluate primary performance and determine epoch primaries.
Starting epoch (Algorithm 2, steps 12-18). The primary pe+1 multi-
casts ⟨new-epoch, e + 1,V,O,pe+1⟩. Here, the setV contains sets
Vu , which carry the valid epoch-change messages of each replica u
of epoch e received by the primary of epoch e + 1, plus the epoch-
change message the primary of epoch e + 1 would have sent. O
consists of sets Ov ∀v ∈ [n] containing pre-prepare messages and
commit-certificates.
Ov is computed as follows. First, the primary determines the
sequence number Smin(v) of the latest stable checkpoint inV and
the highest sequence number Smax(v) in a prepare message inV .
For each sequence number snv between Smin(v) and Smax(v) of
all leaders v ∈ [n] there are three cases: (a) there is at least one
set in Qv of some epoch-change message in V with sequence
number snv , (b) there is at least one set in Pv of some epoch-
change message inV with sequence number snv and none in Qv ,
or (c) there is no such set. In the first case, the primary simply
prepares a commit-certificate it received for snv . In the second
case, the primary creates a new message ⟨pre-prepare, snv , e + 1,d,
pe+1⟩, where d is the request digest in the pre-prepare message for
sequence number snv with the highest epoch number inV . In the
third case, it creates a new pre-prepare message ⟨pre-prepare, snv ,
e+1,dnull ,pe+1⟩, where dnull is the digest of a special null request;
a null request goes through the protocol like other requests, but its
execution is a no-op. If there is a gap between Smax(v) and the last
sequence number assigned to leader v in epoch e , these sequence
numbers will be newly assigned in the next epoch.
Next, the primary appends the messages in O to its log. If Smin(v)
is greater than the sequence number of its latest stable checkpoint,
the primary also inserts the proof of stability (the checkpoint with
sequence number Smin(v)) in its log. Then it enters epoch e + 1; at
this point, it can accept messages for epoch e + 1.
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Figure 3: Schematic ofmessage flow for hanging requests. In
this example, the primary is replica 0, and the request falls
into the bucket of replica 1.
A replica accepts a new-epoch message for epoch e + 1 if: (a) it
is signed properly, (b) the epoch-change messages it contains are
valid for epoch e + 1, (c) the information in V matches the new
request assignment, and (d) the set O is correct. The replica verifies
the correctness of O by performing a computation similar to the
one previously used by the primary. Then, the replica adds the new
information contained in O to its log and decides all requests for
which a commit-certificate was sent. It proceeds by broadcasting a
pre-prepare message for each request in O and sends the message
to the new leader of the bucket in question. The replica then enters
epoch e + 1. Replicas rerun the protocol for messages between
Smin(v) and Smax(v) without a commit-certificate. They do not
execute client requests again (they use their stored information
about the last reply sent to each client instead). As request messages
and stable checkpoints are not included in new-epoch messages,
a replica might not have some of them available. In this case, the
replica can easily obtain themissing information from other replicas
in the system.
Hanging requests. While the primary sends out the pre-prepare
message for all hanging requests, replicas in whose buckets the
requests fall, are responsible for computing prepared- and commit-
certificates of the individual requests. In the example shown in
Figure 3, the primary of epoch e + 1, replica 0, sends a pre-prepare
message for a request in a bucket of replica 1, contained in the
new-epoch message, to everyone. Replica 1 is then responsible
for prepared- and commit-certificates, as well as collecting the
corresponding partial signatures.
Epoch-change timer. A replica sets an epoch-change timer Te
upon entering the epoch-change for epoch e + 1. By default, we
configure the epoch-change timer Te such that a correct primary
can successfully finish the epoch-change after GST. If the timer
expires without seeing a valid new-epoch message, the replica re-
quests an epoch-change for epoch e + 2. If a replica has experienced
at least f unsuccessful consecutive epoch-changes previously, the
replica doubles the timer’s value. It continues to do so until it sees a
valid new-epoch message. We only start doubling the timer after f
unsuccessful consecutive epoch-changes to avoid having f byzan-
tine primaries in a row, i.e., the maximum number of subsequent
byzantine primaries possible, purposely increasing the timer value
exponentially and, in turn, decreasing the system throughput sig-
nificantly. As soon as replicas witness a successful epoch-change,
they reduce Te to its default again.
Assignment of requests. Finally, the number of requests assigned
to each leader is updated during the epoch-change. We limit the
number of requests that can be processed by each leader per epoch
to assign the sequence numbers ahead of time and allow leaders to
work independently of each other. The number of requestCv (e + 1)
assigned to leader v in epoch e + 1 is determined deterministically
based on its past performance (Algorithm 3). By cv (e) we denote
the number of requests committed under leader v in epoch e . Each
leader is re-evaluated during the epoch-change. If a leader success-
fully committed all assigned requests in the preceding epoch, we
double the number of requests this leader is given in the follow-
ing epoch. Else, it is assigned the maximum number of requests it
committed within the last f + 1 epochs.
Algorithm 3 Configuration adjustment
1: initially Cv (1) = Cmin for all replicas v
2: if cv (e) < Cv (e)
3: Cv (e + 1) = max
(
Cmin,maxi ∈{0, ...,f } (cv (e − i))
)
4: else
5: Cv (e + 1) = 2 · cv (e)
Through the configuration adjustment, we assign sequence num-
bers to leaders according to their abilities. As soon as we see a
leader outperforming their workload, we double the number of
requests they are assigned in the following epoch. Additionally,
leaders operating below their expected capabilities are allocated
requests according to the highest potential demonstrated in the
past f + 1 rounds. By looking at the previous f + 1 epochs, we
ensure that there is at least one epoch with a correct primary in
the leader set. In this epoch, the leader had the chance to display
its capabilities. Thus, basing a leader’s performance on the last
f + 1 rounds allows us to see its ability independent of the possible
influence of byzantine primaries.
4 ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that FnF-BFT satisfies the properties spec-
ified in Section 2.5. More specifically, we prove the safety and live-
ness of FnF-BFT, argue that it is efficient, and evaluate its resilience
to byzantine attacks in stable network conditions.
4.1 Safety
FnF-BFT generalizes Linear-PBFT [14], which is an adaptation of
PBFT [8] that reduces its authenticator complexity during epoch
operation. We thus rely on similar arguments to prove FnF-BFT’s
safety in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. If any two correct replicas commit a request with the
same sequence number, they both commit the same request.
Proof. We start by showing that if ⟨prepared-certificate, sn, e,
σ (d)⟩ exists, then ⟨prepared-certificate, sn, e,σ (d ′)⟩ cannot exist
for d ′ , d . Here, d = h(sn∥e∥r ) and d ′ = h(sn∥e ∥r ′). Further, we
assume the probability of r , r ′ and d = d ′ to be negligible. The
existence of ⟨prepared-certificate, sn, e,σ (d)⟩ implies that at least
f + 1 correct replicas sent a pre-prepare message or a prepare
message for the request r with digest d in epoch e with sequence
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number sn. For ⟨prepared-certificate, sn, e,σ (d ′)⟩ to exist, at least
one of these correct replicas needs to have sent two conflicting
prepare messages (pre-prepare messages in case it leads sn). This is
a contradiction.
Through the epoch-change protocol we further ensure that cor-
rect replicas agree on the sequence of requests that are committed
locally in different epochs. The existence of ⟨prepared-certificate,
sn, e,σ (d)⟩ implies that ⟨prepared-certificate, sn, e ′,σ (d ′)⟩ cannot
exist for d ′ , d and e ′ > e . Any correct replica only commits a
request with sequence number sn in epoch e if it saw the corre-
sponding commit-certificate. For a commit-certificate for request r
with digest d and sequence number sn to exist a set R1 of at least
f + 1 correct replicas needs to have seen ⟨prepared-certificate, sn,
e,σ (d)⟩. A correct replica will only accept a pre-prepare message
for epoch e ′ > e after having received a new-epoch message for
epoch e ′. Any correct new-epoch message for epoch e ′ > e must
contain epoch-change messages from a set R2 of at least f + 1 cor-
rect replicas. As there are 2f +1 correct replicas, R1 and R2 intersect
in at least one correct replica u. Replica u’s epoch-change message
ensures that information about request r being prepared in epoch e
is propagated to subsequent epochs, unless sn is already included in
the stable checkpoint of its leader. In case the prepared-certificate
is propagated to the subsequent epoch, a commit-certificate will
potentially be propagated as well. If the new-epoch message only
includes the prepared-certificate for sn, the protocol is redone for
request r with the same sequence number sn. In the two other cases,
the replicas commit sn locally upon seeing the new-epoch message
and a correct replica will never accept a request with sequence
number sn again. □
4.2 Liveness
One cannot guarantee safety and liveness for deterministic BFT
protocols in asynchrony [13].Wewill, therefore, show that FnF-BFT
eventually makes progress after GST. In other words, we consider a
stable network when discussing liveness. Furthermore, we assume
that after an extended period without progress, the time required
for local computation in an epoch-change is negligible. Thus, we
focus on analyzing the network delays for liveness.
Similar to PBFT [8], FnF-BFT’s epoch-change uses the following
three techniques to ensure that correct replicas become synchro-
nized (Definition 2) after GST.
(1) A replica in epoch e observing epoch-change messages from
f + 1 other replicas calling for any epoch(s) greater than e
issues an epoch-change message for the smallest such epoch.
(2) A replica only starts its epoch-change timer after receiving
2f other epoch-change messages, thus ensuring that at least
f + 1 correct replicas have broadcasted an epoch-change
message for the epoch (or higher). Hence, all correct replicas
start their epoch-change timer for an epoch e ′ within at most
2 message delay. After GST, this amounts to at most 2∆.
(3) Byzantine replicas are unable to impede progress by calling
frequent epoch-changes, as an epoch-change will only hap-
pen if at least f + 1 replicas call it. A byzantine primary can
hinder the epoch-change from being successful. However,
there can only be f byzantine primaries in a row.
Definition 2. Two replicas are called synchronized, if they start
their epoch-change timer for an epoch e within at most 2∆.
Lemma 3. After GST, correct replicas eventually become synchro-
nized.
Proof. Letu be the first correct replica to start its epoch-change
timer for epoch e at time t0. Following (2), this implies that u re-
ceived at least 2f other epoch-change messages for epoch e (or
higher). Of these 2f messages, at least f originate from other cor-
rect replicas. Thus, together with its own epoch-change message,
at least f + 1 correct replicas broadcasted epoch-change messages
by time t0. These f + 1 epoch-change messages are seen by all
correct replicas at the latest by time t0+∆. Thus, according to (1), at
time t0 + ∆ all correct replicas broadcast an epoch-change message
for epoch e . Consequently, at time t0 + 2∆ all correct replicas have
received at least 2f other epoch-change messages and will start the
timer for epoch e . □
Lemma 4. After GST, all correct replicas will be in the same epoch
long enough for a correct leader to make progress.
Proof. From Lemma 3, we conclude that after GST, all correct
replicas will eventually enter the same epoch if the epoch-change
timer is sufficiently large. Once the correct replicas are synchro-
nized in their epoch, the duration needed for a correct leader to
commit a request is bounded. Note that all correct replicas will
be in the same epoch for a sufficiently long time as the timers are
configured accordingly. Additionally, byzantine replicas are unable
to impede progress by calling frequent epoch-changes, according
to (3). □
Theorem 5. If a correct client c broadcasts request r , then every
correct replica eventually commits r .
Proof. Following Lemmas 3 and 4, we know that all correct
replicas will eventually be in the same epoch after GST. Hence, in
any epoch with a correct primary, the system will make progress.
Note that a correct client will not issue invalid requests. It remains
to show that an epoch with a correct primary and a correct leader
assigned to hash bucketh(c)will occur. We note that this is given by
the bucket rotation, which ensures that a correct leader repeatedly
serves each bucket in a correct primary epoch. □
4.3 Efficiency
To demonstrate that FnF-BFT is efficient, we start by analyzing
the authenticator complexity for reaching consensus during an
epoch. Like Linear-PBFT [14], using each leader as a collector for
partial signatures in the backup prepare and commit phase, allows
FnF-BFT to achieve linear complexity during epoch operation.
Lemma 6. The authenticator complexity for committing a request
during an epoch is Θ(n).
Proof. During the leader prepare phase, the authenticator com-
plexity is at most n. The primary computes its signature to attach
it to the pre-prepare message. This signature is verified by no more
than n − 1 replicas.
Furthermore, the backup prepare and commit phase’s authenti-
cator complexity is less than 3n each. Initially, at most n−1 backups,
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compute their partial signature and send it to the leader, who, in
turn, verifies 2f of these signatures. The leader then computes its
partial signature, as well as computing the combined signature.
Upon receiving the combined signature, the n − 1 backups need to
verify the signature.
Overall, the authenticator complexity committing a request dur-
ing an epoch is thus at most 7n + o(n) ∈ Θ(n). □
We continue by calculating the authenticator complexity of an
epoch-change. Intuitively speaking, we reduce PBFT’s view-change
complexity from Θ(n3) to Θ(n2) by employing threshold signatures.
However, as FnF-BFT allows for n simultaneous leaders, we obtain
an authenticator complexity of Θ(n3) as a consequence of sharing
the same information for n leaders during the epoch-change.
Lemma 7. The authenticator complexity of an epoch-change is
Θ(n3).
Proof. The epoch-change for epoch e + 1 is initiated by replicas
sending epoch-change messages to the primary of epoch e+1. Each
epoch-change message holds n authenticators for each leader’s last
checkpoint-certificates. As there are at most 2k hanging requests
per leader, a further O(n) authenticators for prepared- and commit-
certificates of the open requests per leader are included in the mes-
sage. Additionally, the sending replica also includes its signature.
Each replica newly computes its signature to sign the epoch-change
message, the remaining authenticators are already available and
do not need to be created by the replicas. Thus, a total of no more
than n authenticators are computed for the epoch-change messages.
We also note epoch-change message contains Θ(n) authenticators.
Therefore, the number of authenticators received by each replica is
Θ(n2).
After the collection of 2f + 1 epoch-change messages, the pri-
mary performs a classical 3-phase reliable broadcast. The primary
broadcasts the same signed message to start the classical 3-phase
reliable broadcast. While the primary computes 1 signature, at most
n − 1 replicas verify this signature. In the two subsequent rounds of
all-to-all communication, each participating replica computes 1 and
verifies 2f signatures. Thereby, the authenticator complexity of
each round of all-to-all communication is at most (2f + 1) ·n. Thus,
the authenticator complexity of the 3-phase reliable broadcast is
bounded by (4f + 3) · n ∈ Θ(n2).
After successfully performing the reliable broadcast, the primary
sends out a new-epoch message to every replica in the network.
The new-epoch message contains the epoch-change messages held
by the primary and the required pre-prepare messages for open re-
quests. There are O(n) such pre-prepare messages, all signed by the
primary. Finally, each new-epoch message is signed by the primary.
Thus, the authenticator complexity of the new-epoch message is
Θ(n2). However, suppose a replica has previously received and ver-
ified an epoch-change from replica u whose epoch-change message
is included in the new-epoch message. In that case, the replica no
longer has to check the authenticators inu’s epoch-change message
again. For the complexity analysis, it does not matter when the
replicas verify the signature. We assume that all replicas verify the
signatures contained in the epoch-change messages before receiv-
ing the new-epoch messages. Thus, the replicas only need to verify
the O(n) new authenticators contained in the new-epoch message.
Overall, the authenticator complexity of the the epoch-change
is at most Θ(n3). □
Finally, we argue that after GST, there is sufficient progress by
correct replicas to compensate for the high epoch-change cost.
Theorem 8. After GST, the amortized authenticator complexity
of committing a request is Θ(n).
Proof. To find the amortized authenticator complexity of com-
mitting a request, we consider an epoch and the following epoch-
change. After GST, the authenticator complexity of committing a
request for a correct leader is Θ(n). The timeout value is set such
that a correct worst-case leader creates at leastCmin requests in each
epoch initiated by a correct primary. Thus, there are Θ(n) correct
replicas, each committing Cmin requests. By setting Cmin ∈ Ω(n2),
we guarantee that at least Ω(n3) requests are created during an
epoch given a correct primary.
Byzantine primaries can ensure that no progress is made in
epochs they initiate, by failing to share the new-epochmessage with
correct replicas. However, at most, a constant fraction of epochs
lies in the responsibility of byzantine primaries. We conclude that,
on average, Ω(n3) requests are created during an epoch.
Following Lemma 7, the authenticator complexity of an epoch-
change is Θ(n3). Note that the epoch-change timeout Te is set so
that correct primaries can successfully finish the epoch-change
after GST. Not every epoch-change will be successful immediately,
as byzantine primaries might cause unsuccessful epoch-changes.
Specifically, byzantine primaries can purposefully summon an un-
successful epoch-change to decrease efficiency.
In case of an unsuccessful epoch-change, replicas initiate another
epoch-change – and continue doing so – until a successful epoch-
change occurs. However, we only need to start O(1) epoch-changes
on average to be successful after GST, as the primary rotation
ensures that at least a constant fraction of primaries is correct.
Hence, the average cost required to reach a successful epoch-change
is Θ(n3).
We find the amortized request creation cost by adding the request
creation cost to the ratio between the cost of a successful epoch-
change and the number of requests created in an epoch, that is,
Θ(n) + Θ(n
3)
Ω(n3) = Θ(n).
□
Thus, we have shown that FnF-BFT is efficient.
4.4 Optimistic Performance
Throughout this section, we make the following optimistic assump-
tions: all replicas are considered correct, and the network is stable
and synchronous. We employ this model to assess the optimistic
performance of FnF-BFT, i.e., theoretically evaluating its best-case
throughput. Note that this scenario is motivated by practical appli-
cations, as one would hope to have functioning hardware at hand,
at least initially.
Additionally, we assume that the best-case throughput is limited
by the available computing power of each replica – predominantly
required for the computation and verification of cryptographic sig-
natures. We further assume that the available computing power at
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each correct replica is the same, which we believe to be realistic as
the same hardware will often be employed for each replica in prac-
tice. Without loss of generality, each leader can compute/verify one
authenticator per time unit. As throughput, we define the number
of requests committed by the system per time unit.
Finally, we assume that replicas only verify the authenticators
of relevant messages. For example, a leader receiving 3f prepare
messages for a request will only verify 2f authenticators. Similarly,
pre-prepare messages outside the leaders’ watermarks will not be
processed by backups.
Note that we will carry all assumptions into Section 4.5. There
they will, however, only apply to correct replicas.
4.4.1 Sequential-Leader Protocols. We claim that FnF-BFT achieves
higher throughput than sequential-leader protocols by the means
of leader parallelization. To support this claim, we compare FnF-
BFT’s throughput to that of a generic sequential-leader protocol.
The generic sequential-leader protocol will serve as an asymptotic
characterization of many state-of-the-art sequential-leader proto-
cols [8, 14, 27].
A sequential-leader protocol is characterized by having a unique
leader at any point in time. Throughout its reign, the leader is re-
sponsible for serving all client requests. Depending on the protocol,
the leader is rotated repeatedly or only upon failure.
Lemma 9. A sequential-leader protocol requires at least Ω(n) time
units to process a client request.
Proof. In sequential-leader protocols, a unique replica is respon-
sible for serving all client requests at any point in time. This replica
must verify Ω(n) signatures to commit a request while no other
replica leads requests simultaneously. Thus, a sequential-leader
protocol requires Ω(n) time units to process a request. □
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
Figure 4: Sequential leader example with four leaders.
Throughout its reign a sequential leader is responsible for
serving all client requests. Leader changes are indicated by
vertical lines.
4.4.2 FnF-BFT Epoch. With FnF-BFT, we propose a parallel-leader
protocol (cf. Figure 5) that divides client requests intom · n inde-
pendent hash buckets. Each hash bucket is assigned to a unique
leader at any time. The hash buckets are rotated between leaders
across epochs to ensure liveness (cf. Section 3.3). Within an epoch,
a leader is only responsible for committing client requests from
its assigned hash bucket(s). Overall, this parallelization leads to a
significant speed-up.
To show the speed-up gained through parallelization, we first an-
alyze the optimistic epoch throughput of FnF-BFT, i.e., the through-
put of the system during stable networking conditions in the best-
case scenario with 3f + 1 correct replicas. Furthermore, we assume
the number of requests included in a checkpoint to be sufficiently
large, such that no leader must ever stall when waiting for a check-
point to be created. We analyze the effects of epoch-changes and
1# -00
2# -01
3# -10
4# -11
4
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
Figure 5: Parallel leader example with four leaders and four
hash buckets. In each epoch, leaders are only responsible for
serving client requests in their hash bucket. Epoch-changes
are indicated by vertical lines.
compute the overall best-case throughput of FnF-BFT in the afore-
mentioned optimistic setting.
Lemma 10. After GST, the best-case epoch throughput with 3f + 1
correct replicas is
k · (3f + 1)
k · (19f + 3) + (8f + 2) .
Proof. In the optimistic setting, all epochs are initiated by cor-
rect primaries, and thus all replicas will be synchronized after GST.
In FnF-BFT, n leaders work on client requests simultaneously. As
in sequential-leader protocols, each leader needs to verify at least
O(n) signatures to commit a request. A leader needs to compute
3 and verify 4f authenticators precisely to commit a request it
proposes during epoch operation. Thus, leaders need to process a
total of 4f + 3 ∈ Θ(n) signatures to commit a request. With the
help of threshold signatures, backups involved in committing a
request only need to compute 2 and verify 3 authenticators. We
follow that a total of 4f + 3 + 5 · 3f = 19f + 3 authenticators are
computed/verified by a replica for one of its own requests and 3f
requests of other leaders.
After GST, each correct leader v will quickly converge to a Cv
such that it will make progress for the entire epoch-time, hence,
working at its full potential. We achieve this by rapidly increasing
the number of requests assigned to each leader outperforming its
assignment and never decreasing the assignment below what the
replica recently managed.
Checkpoints are created every k requests and add to the com-
putational load. A leader verifies and computes a total of 2f + 2
messages to create a checkpoint, and the backups are required to
compute 1 partial signature and verify 1 threshold signature. The
authenticator cost of creating 3f + 1 checkpoints, one for each
leader, is, therefore, 8f + 2 per replica.
Thus, the best-case throughput of the system is
k · (3f + 1)
k · (19f + 3) + (8f + 2) .
□
Note that it would have been sufficient to show that the epoch
throughput is Ω(1) per time unit, but this more precise formula will
be required in Section 4.5. Additionally, we would like to point out
11
Avarikioti et al.
that the choice of k does not influence the best-case throughput
asymptotically.
4.4.3 FnF-BFT Epoch-Change. As FnF-BFT employs bounded-length
epochs, repeated epoch-changes have to be considered. In the fol-
lowing, we will show that FnF-BFT’s throughput is dominated by its
authenticator complexity during the epochs. To that end, observe
that for Cmin ∈ Ω(n2), every epoch will incur an authenticator
complexity of Ω(n3) per replica and thus require Ω(n3) time units.
Lemma 11. After GST, an epoch-change under a correct primary
requires Θ(n2) time units.
Proof. Following Lemma 7, the number of authenticators com-
puted and verified by each replica for all epoch-change messages is
Θ(n2). Each replica also processes Θ(n) signatures during the reli-
able broadcast, and O(n) signatures for the new-epoch messages.
Overall, each replica thus processes Θ(n2) authenticators during
the epoch-change. Subsequently, this implies that the epoch-change
requires Θ(n2) time units, as we require only a constant number of
message delays to initiate and complete the epoch-change protocol.
Recall that we assume the throughput to be limited by the available
computing power of each replica. □
Theoretically, one could set Cmin even higher such that the time
the system spends with epoch-changes becomes negligible. How-
ever, there is a trade-off for practical reasons: increasing Cmin will
naturally increase the minimal epoch-length, allowing a byzan-
tine primary to slow down the system for a longer time stretch.
Note that the guarantee for byzantine-resilient performance (cf.
Section 4.5) will still hold.
4.4.4 FnF-BFT Optimistic Performance. Ultimately, it remains to
quantify FnF-BFT’s overall best-case throughput.
Lemma 12. After GST, and assuming all replicas are correct, FnF-
BFT requires O(n) time units to process n client requests on average.
Proof. Under a correct primary, each correct leader will commit
at least Cmin ∈ Ω(n2) requests after GST. Hence, FnF-BFT will
spend at least Ω(n3) time units in an epoch, while only requiring
Θ(n2) time units for an epoch-change (Lemma 11). Thus, following
Lemma 10, FnF-BFT requires an average of O(n) time units to
process n client requests. □
Following Lemmas 9 and 12, the speed-up gained by moving
from a sequential-leader protocol to a parallel-leader protocol is
proportional to the number of leaders.
Theorem 13. If the throughput is limited by the (equally) available
computing power at each replica, the speed-up for equally splitting
requests between n parallel leaders over a sequential-leader protocol
is at least Ω(n).
4.5 Byzantine-Resilient Performance
While many BFT protocols present practical evaluations of their
performance that completely ignore byzantine adversarial behav-
ior [8, 14, 25, 27], we provide a novel, theory-based byzantine-
resilience guarantee. We first analyze the impact of byzantine repli-
cas in an epoch under a correct primary. Next, we discuss the po-
tential strategies of a byzantine primary trying to stall the system.
And finally, we conflate our observations into a concise statement.
4.5.1 Correct Primary Throughput. To gain insight into the byzantine-
resilient performance, we analyze the optimal byzantine strategy.
In epochs led by correct primaries, we will consider their roles as
backups and leaders separately. On the one hand, for a byzantine
leader, the optimal strategy is to leave as many requests hanging,
while not making any progress (Lemma 14).
Lemma 14. After GST and under a correct primary, the optimal
strategy for a byzantine leader is to leave 2k client requests hanging
and commit no request.
Proof. Correct replicas will be synchronized as a correct pri-
mary initiates the epoch. Thus, byzantine replicas’ participation is
not required for correct leaders to make progress.
A byzantine leader can follow the protocol accurately (at any
chosen speed), send messages that do not comply with the protocol,
or remain unresponsive.
If following the protocol, a byzantine leader can open at most
2k client requests simultaneously as all further prepare messages
would be discarded. Leaving the maximum possible number of
requests hanging achieves a throughput reduction as it increases the
number of authenticators shared during the epoch and the epoch-
change. Hence, byzantine leaders leave the maximum number of
requests hanging.
While byzantine replicas cannot hinder correct leaders from
committing requests, committing any request can only benefit the
throughput of FnF-BFT. To that end, note that after GST, each
correct leaderv will converge to aCv such that it will make progress
during the entire epoch-time; hence, prolonging the epoch-time is
impossible. The optimal strategy for byzantine leaders is thus to
stall progress on their assigned hash buckets.
Finally, note that we assume the threshold signature scheme
to be robust and can, therefore, discard any irrelevant message
efficiently. □
On the other hand, as a backup, the optimal byzantine strategy
is not helping other leaders to make progress (Lemma 15).
Lemma 15. Under a correct primary, the optimal strategy for a
byzantine backup is to remain unresponsive.
Proof. Byzantine participation in the protocol can only benefit
the correct leaders’ throughput as they can simply ignore invalid
messages. Any authenticators received in excess messages will not
be verified and thus do not reduce the system throughput.
□
In conclusion, we observe that byzantine replicas have little
opportunity to reduce the throughput in epochs under a correct
primary.
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Theorem 16. After GST, the effective utilization under a correct
primary is at least 89 for n →∞.
Proof. Moving from the best-case scenario with 3f + 1 correct
leaders to only 2f + 1 correct leaders, each correct leader still pro-
cesses 4f + 3 authenticators per request, and 5 authenticators for
each request of other leaders. We know from Lemma 14 that only
the 2f + 1 correct replicas are committing requests and creating
checkpoints throughout the epoch. The authenticator cost of creat-
ing 2f + 1 checkpoints, one for each correct leader, becomes 6f + 2
per replica.
Byzantine leaders can open at most 2k new requests in an epoch.
Each hanging request is seen at most twice by correct replicas with-
out becoming committed. Thus, each correct replica processes no
more than 8k authenticators for requests purposefully left hanging
by a byzantine replica in an epoch. Thus, the utilization is reduced
at most by a factor
(
1 − 8kfT
)
, whereT is the maximal epoch length.
While epochs can finish earlier, this will not happen after GST as
soon as each correct leader v works at its capacity Cv .
Hence, the byzantine-resilient epoch throughput becomes
k · (2f + 1)
k · (14f + 3) + (6f + 2) ·
(
1 − 8k f
T
)
.
By comparing this to the best-case epoch throughput fromLemma 10,
we obtain a maximal throughput reduction of
(2f + 1)(k · (19f + 3) + (8f + 2))
(3f + 1)(k · (14f + 3) + (6f + 2)) ·
(
1 − 8k f
T
)
.
Observe that the first term decreases and approaches 89 for n →∞:
(2f + 1)(k · (19f + 3) + (8f + 2))
(3f + 1)(k · (14f + 3) + (6f + 2))
n→∞
=
16 + 38k
18 + 42k ≥
8
9 .
We follow that the epoch time is T ∈ Ω(n3), as we set Cmin ∈
Ω(n2) and each leader requires Ω(n) time units to commit one of
its requests. Additionally, we know that 8k f ∈ O(n), and thus:(
1 − 8k f
T
)
n→∞
= 1.
In the limit n →∞, the throughput reduction byzantine replicas
can impose on the system during a synchronized epoch is therefore
bounded by a factor 89 . □
4.5.2 Byzantine Primary Throughput. A byzantine primary, evi-
dently, aims to perform the epoch-change as slow as possible. Fur-
thermore, a byzantine primary can impede progress in its assigned
epoch entirely, e.g., by remaining unresponsive. We observe that
there are two main byzantine strategies to be considered.
Lemma 17. Under a byzantine primary, an epoch is either aborted
quickly or Ω(n3) new requests become committed.
Proof. A byzantine adversary controlling the primary of an
epoch has three options. Following the protocol and initiating the
epoch for all 2f + 1 correct replicas will ensure high throughput
and is thus not optimal. Alternatively, initiating the epoch for s ∈
[f + 1, 2f ] correct replicas will allow the byzantine adversary to
control the progress made in the epoch, as no correct leader can
make progress without a response from at least one byzantine
replica. However, slow progress can only be maintained as long
as at least 2f + 1 leaders continuously make progress. By setting
the no-progress timeout Tp ∈ Θ(T /Cmin), Ω(n3) new requests per
epoch can be guaranteed. In all other scenarios, the epoch will
be aborted after at most one epoch-change timeout Te , the initial
message transmission time 5∆, and one no-progress timeout Tp .
Note that we do not increase the epoch-change timer Te for f
unsuccessful epoch-changes in a row. In doing so, we prevent f
consecutive byzantine primaries from increasing the epoch-change
timer exponentially; thus potentially reducing the system through-
put significantly. □
4.5.3 FnF-BFT Primaries. We rotate primaries across epochs based
on primary performance history to reduce the control of the byzan-
tine adversary on the system.
Lemma 18. After a sufficiently long stable time period, the perfor-
mance of a byzantine primary can only drop below the performance
of the worst correct primary once throughout the sliding window.
Proof. The network is considered stable for a sufficiently long
time when all leaders work at their capacity limit, i.e., the number
of requests they are assigned in an epoch matches their capacity,
and primaries have subsequently been explored once. As soon
as all leaders are working at their capacity limit, we observe the
representative performance of all correct primaries, at least.
FnF-BFT repeatedly cycles through the 2f + 1 best primaries. A
primary’s performance is based on its last turn as primary. Con-
sequently, a primary is removed from the rotation as soon as its
performance drops below one of the f remaining primaries. We
conclude that a byzantine primary will only be nominated beyond
its single exploration throughout the sliding window if its per-
formance matches at least the performance of the worst correct
primary. □
As its successor determines a primary’s performance, the suc-
cessor can influence the performance slightly. However, this is
bounded by the number of open requests – O(n) many – which we
consider being well within natural performance variations, as Ω(n3)
requests are created in an epoch under a correct primary. Thus, we
will disregard possible performance degradation originating at the
succeeding primary.
From Lemma 18, we easily see that the optimal strategy for a
byzantine primary is to act according to Lemma 17 – performing
better would only help the system. In a stable network, byzantine
primaries will thus only have one turn as primary throughout
any sliding window. In the following, we consider a primary to be
behaving byzantine if it performs worse than all correct primaries.
Theorem 19. After the system has been in stability for a suffi-
ciently long time period, the fraction of byzantine behaving primaries
is fд .
Proof. Following from Lemma 18, we know that a primary can
only behave byzantine once throughout the sliding window.
There are a total of д epochs throughout a sliding window, and
the f byzantine replicas in the network can only act byzantine in
one epoch included in the sliding window. We see that the fraction
of byzantine behaving primaries is fд . □
13
Avarikioti et al.
The configuration parameter д determines the fraction of byzan-
tine primaries in the system’s stable state, while simultaneously
dictating how long it takes to get there after GST. Settingд to a small
value ensures that the system quickly recovers from asynchrony.
On the other hand, setting д to larger values provides near-optimal
behavior once the system is operating at its optimum.
4.5.4 FnF-BFT Byzantine-Resilient Performance. Combining the
byzantine strategies from Theorem 16, Lemma 17 and Theorem 19,
we obtain the following.
Theorem 20. After GST, the effective utilization is asymptotically
8
9 ·
д − f
д
for n →∞.
Proof. To estimate the effective utilization, we only consider
the throughput within epochs. That is because the time spent in
correct epochs dominates the time for epoch-changes, as well as
the time for failed epoch-changes under byzantine primaries, as
the number of replicas increases (Lemma 11).
Without loss of generality, we consider no progress to be made
in byzantine primary epochs. We make this assumption, as we
cannot guarantee asymptotically significant throughput. From The-
orem 16, we know that in an epoch initiated by a correct primary,
the byzantine-resilient effective utilization is at least 89 for n →∞.
Further, at least д−fд of the epochs are led by correct primaries after
a sufficiently long time period in stability and thus obey this bound
(Theorem 19). In the limit for n → ∞ the effective utilization is
8
9 · д−fд . □
We conclude that FnF-BFT’s byzantine-resilient utilization is
asymptotically 89 · д−fд > 1627 for n →∞.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
5.1 Conclusion
In this work, we introduce Fast’n’Fair-BFT, a novel state-machine
replication protocol that tolerates byzantine faults in partially syn-
chronous networks. FnF-BFT parallelizes the execution of client
requests by allowing all replicas to act as leaders, while the re-
quest load dynamically changes between epochs according to each
leader’s past performance. This way, FnF-BFT distributes the load
fairly amongst all replicas –moving the system forward at the speed
of n leaders as opposed to one leader. Parallelizing leader-based
protocols does not come at the cost of efficiency, as we match the
communication complexity of state-of-the-art leader-based BFT pro-
tocols. Finally, FnF-BFT is analyzed by a novel byzantine-resilient
performance bound. Efficient BFT protocols only consider non-
malicious attacks in their performance evaluation; this might be
too optimistic.
5.2 Future Work
To further develop FnF-BFT, we envision a protocol implementation
for an empirical evaluation and a comparison to state-of-the-art BFT
protocols. We expect the experimental exploration to demonstrate
the strength of the parallelization underlying FnF-BFT and to unveil
the performance vulnerability to byzantine attacks persistent in
existing protocols.
Additionally, a further investigation into the possibility of im-
proving system performance through incorporating leader perfor-
mance into the primary rotation could bring further system insights.
In practice, we also foresee a performance increase by adjusting the
size of the sliding window based on network observations, which
could be studied as part of the evaluation.
REFERENCES
[1] Ittai Abraham, Guy Gueta, Dahlia Malkhi, Lorenzo Alvisi, Rama Kotla, and Jean-
Philippe Martin. 2017. Revisiting fast practical byzantine fault tolerance. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1712.01367 (2017).
[2] Yair Amir, Brian Coan, Jonathan Kirsch, and John Lane. 2008. Byzantine replica-
tion under attack. In 2008 IEEE International Conference on Dependable Systems
and Networks With FTCS and DCC (DSN). IEEE, 197–206.
[3] Yair Amir, Brian Coan, Jonathan Kirsch, and John Lane. 2010. Prime: Byzantine
replication under attack. IEEE transactions on dependable and secure computing 8,
4 (2010), 564–577.
[4] Yair Amir, Claudiu Danilov, Danny Dolev, Jonathan Kirsch, John Lane, Cristina
Nita-Rotaru, Josh Olsen, and David Zage. 2008. Steward: Scaling Byzantine fault-
tolerant replication to wide area networks. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing 7, 1 (2008), 80–93.
[5] P. Aublin, S. B. Mokhtar, and V. Quéma. 2013. RBFT: Redundant Byzantine Fault
Tolerance. In 2013 IEEE 33rd International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems. 297–306.
[6] Georgia Avarikioti, Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019.
Divide and Scale: Formalization of Distributed Ledger Sharding Protocols.
arXiv:1910.10434 [cs.DC]
[7] Alysson Bessani, João Sousa, and Eduardo EP Alchieri. 2014. State machine repli-
cation for the masses with BFT-SMaRt. In 2014 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks. IEEE, 355–362.
[8] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. 2002. Practical Byzantine fault tolerance and
proactive recovery. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) 20, 4 (2002),
398–461.
[9] Allen Clement, Edmund L Wong, Lorenzo Alvisi, Michael Dahlin, and Mirco
Marchetti. 2009. Making Byzantine Fault Tolerant Systems Tolerate Byzantine
Faults. In NSDI, Vol. 9. 153–168.
[10] Danny Dolev and Rüdiger Reischuk. 1985. Bounds on information exchange for
Byzantine agreement. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 32, 1 (1985), 191–204.
[11] Danny Dolev and H Raymond Strong. 1982. Polynomial algorithms for multiple
processor agreement. In Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on
Theory of computing. 401–407.
[12] Cynthia Dwork, Nancy Lynch, and Larry Stockmeyer. 1988. Consensus in the
presence of partial synchrony. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 35, 2 (1988), 288–323.
[13] Michael J Fischer, Nancy A Lynch, and Michael S Paterson. 1985. Impossibility
of distributed consensus with one faulty process. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 32,
2 (1985), 374–382.
[14] Guy Golan Gueta, Ittai Abraham, Shelly Grossman, Dahlia Malkhi, Benny Pinkas,
Michael K Reiter, Dragos-Adrian Seredinschi, Orr Tamir, and Alin Tomescu. 2018.
SBFT: a scalable decentralized trust infrastructure for blockchains. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.01626 (2018).
[15] Suyash Gupta, Jelle Hellings, and Mohammad Sadoghi. 2019. Scaling blockchain
databases through parallel resilient consensus paradigm. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1911.00837 (2019).
[16] Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Philipp Jovanovic, Linus Gasser, Nicolas Gailly, Ewa
Syta, and Bryan Ford. 2018. OmniLedger: A Secure, Scale-Out, Decentralized
Ledger via Sharding. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2018 IEEE Symposium on. 19–34.
[17] Ramakrishna Kotla, Lorenzo Alvisi, Mike Dahlin, Allen Clement, and Edmund
Wong. 2007. Zyzzyva: speculative byzantine fault tolerance. ACM SIGOPS
Operating Systems Review 41, 6 (2007), 45–58.
[18] Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. 1982. The Byzantine Gen-
erals Problem. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 4, 3
(1982), 382–401.
[19] Nancy A Lynch. 1996. Distributed algorithms. Elsevier.
[20] Yanhua Mao, Flavio P. Junqueira, and Keith Marzullo. 2008. Mencius: Building
Efficient Replicated State Machines for WANs. In Proceedings of the 8th USENIX
Conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (San Diego, Califor-
nia) (OSDI’08). USENIX Association, USA, 369–384.
[21] Zarko Milosevic, Martin Biely, and André Schiper. 2013. Bounded delay in
Byzantine-tolerant state machine replication. In 2013 IEEE 32nd International
Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems. IEEE, 61–70.
[22] Marshall Pease, Robert Shostak, and Leslie Lamport. 1980. Reaching agreement
in the presence of faults. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 27, 2 (1980), 228–234.
14
FnF-BFT: Exploring Performance Limits of BFT Protocols
[23] Michael K Reiter. 1994. Secure agreement protocols: Reliable and atomic group
multicast in Rampart. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. 68–80.
[24] Michael K Reiter. 1995. The Rampart toolkit for building high-integrity services.
In Theory and practice in distributed systems. Springer, 99–110.
[25] Chrysoula Stathakopoulou, Tudor David, and Marko Vukolić. 2019. Mir-bft:
High-throughput BFT for blockchains. arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.05552 (2019).
[26] Giuliana Santos Veronese, Miguel Correia, Alysson Neves Bessani, and Lau Cheuk
Lung. 2009. Spin one’s wheels? Byzantine fault tolerance with a spinning primary.
In 2009 28th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems. IEEE,
135–144.
[27] Maofan Yin, Dahlia Malkhi, Michael K Reiter, Guy Golan Gueta, and Ittai Abra-
ham. 2019. Hotstuff: Bft consensus with linearity and responsiveness. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2019 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing.
347–356.
[28] Mahdi Zamani, Mahnush Movahedi, and Mariana Raykova. 2018. Rapidchain:
Scaling blockchain via full sharding. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 931–948.
15
